

INTRODUCTION

We shall thus have to account the capacity to feel to a certain degree unhistorically as being more vital and more fundamental, inasmuch as it constitutes the foundation upon which alone anything truly human can grow. The unhistorical is like an atmosphere within which alone life can germinate and with the destruction of which it must vanish.¹

This book does not aim to give a broad account of sensibility and sentiment in the eighteenth century: it is focused instead on sympathy. It deals with the actual affective and imaginative experience of feeling what it is like to be someone or something other than one's self. Except for some sketches of background events, such as the political struggles in England during the seventeenth century and the Revolution in France at the end of the eighteenth, there is little attempt to relate sympathy directly to historical events or to cultural and social developments; although there is much that could be said of this connection, particularly in the sphere of imperial expansion and colonial settlement. I begin with the tentative claim that sympathy thrives in situations of comparative powerlessness in which the function and tendency of social roles is no longer directly apparent to those who fill them, either because power is the prerogative of an absolute authority or because it is distributed in ways that cannot be fully understood. It is amidst the bankruptcy of a clearly stated regime of moral virtue, such as feudal obligation or Christian charity, that the passionate spontaneity of sympathy finds its opportunities for expression. And when taken, these opportunities show the relationships between participants fulfilling very different social, political and historical purposes from what these had formerly been conceived to be, either by themselves or by society at large. Sometimes, in the most dramatically interesting scenes of sympathy, they are revealed to be fulfilling no purpose at all.

So it is first of all with the activity of sympathy that I am concerned, and then with the ways that people thought about it and tried to explain, justify, exploit or direct it. Almost all my examples are from literary or philosophical sources, very few from accounts of actual exchanges between people. The reason for this is to be found in the course of the argument, which locates sympathy at the cen-

tre of a fascinating and very tense debate about the value of testimony and the reality of the person who gives it. Almost all contributors to this debate occupy a sceptical position, either fully announced like Descartes's or implicit like Mandeville's, that prevents any safe assumption being made about the truth of facts or the nature of being. To this extent sympathy is both the object of discussion and, more formidably, an issue hanging over the terms in which the discussion is pursued. It is what cannot be taken for granted because it cannot be explicitly stated or proved: like accounts of aesthetic judgement or public opinion, the account of sympathy ends up in company with a *je ne sais quoi* which may be sidestepped by various rhetorical appeals to common sense, but which can never be vindicated as a demonstrable truth. Arguments about sympathy are won or lost according to more flexible standards of the probable, the surprising or the painful. In many respects the critique of sympathy is like the critique of the sublime, determined as much by how it is performed as by what it means. According to Pope, Longinus 'is himself the great sublime he draws,'² and likewise we might say of Adam Smith that he opens up so many intriguing and contradictory avenues to sympathy that he seems in effect to sympathize with its scope.

In this volume, I list four types of sympathy, and suggest a fifth. The four seem to be most obviously in play in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and the fifth is still with us today. I name these mechanical, social, theatrical, complete and horrid. Between the first and the last there is the shadow of something akin to historical development as the practice of sympathy is seen responding to changing political and social circumstances and to altered notions of the nature and extent of rights. This partly justifies the use of the word 'evolution' in the title, for it will become clear that any expectation that sympathy is an exclusively human activity that refers to human aims and values is not going to be answered. Sympathy invites Cartesians to feel divine; it makes Mandeville, an ex-Cartesian, feel most keenly what it is like to be an animal. It carries its practitioners above and below the level of the human. As sympathy gives way in radical thought to notions of individual rights, the idea of humanity as a distinctive moral quality migrates in a similar way, and is attached more and more firmly to sympathy with animal suffering. At the same time sympathy yields examples of personification – it is itself personified in a lengthy poem by Samuel Jackson Pratt – and what is distinctive about personification is its coalition of causes and effects in the one phenomenon, such as Death that appears as its own victim. Hobbes thought personification was a fallible rhetorical manoeuvre verging on the idolatrous in its crediting matter with the power of moving itself. Hume and Smith find it intimately part of the structure of polytheism. So sympathy, or Sympathy, takes us as close as we get in secular thought to an intimation of the gods. Throughout this book I find it useful to refer to a fable of the metamorphic

power of the passions that straddles both of these extremes: Lucius Apuleius's *The Golden Ass*, with its fascinating inset story of Cupid and Psyche.

Interest in sympathy begins with questions about the nature and limits of the self that became urgent in the seventeenth century under pressure from the Reformation, rising capitalism and revolutionary politics. Rather than making any claims about the destinations of these questions in terms of various kinds of individualism and the discourse of rights, I keep my eye fixed on the breadth of the inquiry as it refers to the passions generally and sympathy in particular. For sympathy to take place there must be two identifiable points of sentience in the shape of that which or who sympathizes, and that which or whom is sympathized with, whether it be animate or inanimate, for both possibilities are allowed. In the doctrine of the passions as it was set out by thinkers as different as Descartes and Spinoza this was not an easy hypothesis to sustain because it assigns to passion an active virtue. For them as well as for the tradition of Aristotelian thought on which they partly rely, action and passion are antithetic. To act is to impinge consciously upon the world and to change it in accordance with a clear idea of what you are doing. To suffer an action on the other hand, that is to be passive, is to be an object altered by action, left in a state of passion with no clear idea of what has happened. Sympathy comprises both elements of this antithesis, allowing passion an active role and, in scenes of complex sympathy such as those imagined by Hume and Smith, a reactive one too. In the terms proposed by Spinoza, for example, sympathy is anomalous, producing hybrids of intentions and events, as it were *actssions* and *pactions*, such as an act of will passionately pursued corresponding only with an imperfect idea of what was intended.

Where is the self to be found in such a mixture? Since the division between action and passion reflects a division between an imperative power and its opposite, it seemed best to begin with Descartes and the parallels between absolutism in France and the autonomy he assigns his idea of the self. The strange example he gives in his *The Passions of the Soul* concerns a widower grieving moderately for his dead wife who suddenly realizes that he is not going to miss her at all, and in fact is rather relieved that she has passed out of his life. While still pitying her, his soul recoils triumphantly upon itself and, relishing the thought of its independence from all material accidents, experiences joy. There is a mixture here of the unexpected – the sudden realization followed instantly by feelings of joy – in company with a celebration of free-will, the passion with the action; but it is the result of what Descartes would call self-excitement and quite shamelessly removed from what we might have supposed to be the true object of sympathy. There are variants of this passionate grasp of the sense of autonomy, resulting in something like self-sympathy, to be found in the line of philosophers credited with the discovery of the moral sense. Francis Hutcheson argued that we have a taste for the well-being of others, much as Descartes's widower finds it right to

weep for his wife, but that this does not have to be vindicated by any outcome: the desire is enough. It testifies not so much to our ability to act as our inclination to feel, and this inclination itself is a real cause of self-delight. Hutcheson finds it convenient therefore to distinguish between the multitude of passions excited in actual transactions with other people and these higher feelings which he calls affections and limits to two: desire and aversion.

Shaftesbury combing and whetting his social wings in what he calls his vocal looking-glass is in much the same kind of technical or ironical relation to actual sympathy, for really what he seeks is what Ralph Cudworth calls the hegemonic sense of self, that recoil of self-love that is absolutely empowering, and which (according to Descartes) makes a human feel like God. It makes Shaftesbury feel like a king. However, Shaftesbury and Smith widen considerably the element of the unexpected in this exercise of self-inspection. Shaftesbury's *A Philosophical Regimen*, unpublished until 1900, is a remarkable collection of examples of passionate self-disgust, often lapsing into fantasies of amputation and self-mutilation, indicating that the secular and carnal world, explicitly identified as the seductive temptation to sympathy, is harder to transcend or to cut out than Shaftesbury's published work would suggest. Even though he recommends a stoical control of the passions consistent with Shaftesbury's perfected self, Smith is much more hospitable to accident and the force of Fortune. He presents figures from the drama who confront themselves as Shaftesbury never wanted to, except in private, and that is as the opposite of what they meant to be: a virtuous woman who finds herself an adultress, another who discovers she has committed bigamy, or Oedipus at Colonus, complaining that what has happened to him is what he unintentionally did. Here self-sympathy breaks its Cartesian bounds, overflowing into regions we would all recognize as proper to sympathy, and this is owing to Smith's alertness to the importance of what he calls piacular guilt, known in common law as faultless trespass. That is to say he is interested in exploring to its fullest extent the hybrid that Descartes initiated, where action and passion, intention and accident, provoke potent and unpredictable effects, including strong affective bonds between different people.

Descartes and the Cambridge Platonists call the self the thinking thing, or soul, or the thing which only is, or immaterial substance. That is not what Hobbes and Locke call it. They agree in naming the functioning social individual, someone with legal responsibilities and rights, a person. Hobbes distinguishes between a natural person, or author, and an artificial person, or actor. With unmistakable allusions to the stage as well as the law-courts, he says an artificial person is a representative standing in some recognizable relation to sovereign power. Originally the person was not an actor but an author, the one who authorized power to the commonwealth by handing over his natural rights to the original person or artificial man of the commonwealth, first of all personated

by the sovereign and then by all his dependent deputies, magistrates and vicars. Locke with equal care distinguishes his person from possible synonyms, such as man, character, soul, self and consciousness. It is in fact a blend of the last two that constitutes his person; it is the person who, with the temporal advantage supplied by consciousness, owns and imputes to himself the deeds and narrative of the self. Locke's person is as artificial as Hobbes's but for different reasons. The unity of Hobbes's person derives from the unity of Leviathan itself, the artificial man, represented by a single figure comprising what was once a multitude. The unity of Locke's derives from the ability of the person to disguise the discontinuities of self-consciousness and make it seem coherent. However, both are agreed that the experience of the person depends entirely upon sensations caused by objects. Sense-impressions of things, stored as ideas, provide the stuff of consciousness and of the self that Locke's person claims to be; and for Hobbes they supply the imagination with what it needs to invent fictions of social and political union.

Nothing could more clearly marked than the difference between this sort of materialist empiricism, which relies for knowledge entirely upon the sensations caused by things acting on the senses, and Cartesian scepticism, which retreats to the minimal certainty not of the sentient but the thinking thing. Empiricism represents for the Cartesians total subjection to passion, a complete and humiliating alternative to action. Instead of proceeding from the perfectly conceived idea of the self, the empirical first person starts with nothing, and acquires its dimensions and stuff in a series of accidental encounters with things which, when striking upon each individual sensorium, excite first our sensations, then our passions and finally our ideas which, according to Spinoza's equation, must necessarily be less than perfect. Neither Hobbes nor Locke is interested in disputing the imperfection of our ideas, they are concerned instead to show how this imperfection is no impediment to the artificial unity of the state and the person. Basically this is achieved by means of fiction. Whatever is missing from the account is supplied by means of imagination. Hobbes is quite explicit about this fictional supplement. When talking of the system of representation in the state, and how it may include even inanimate things, he points out that, 'There are few things, that are incapable of being represented by Fiction.'³ Locke is less explicit, but in the section on personal identity in the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* he defines his position negatively by means of what he calls wild fancies, as if tame fancies were not only the eligible but the only alternatives. Hume is quite sure that Locke's position on identity is a fiction:

For when we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not confin'd to the expression, but is commonly attended with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fictions.⁴

So in different ways we find these two political philosophers going to some trouble to settle the issue of probable versus improbable fictions, with Hobbes holding up to scorn what he calls gloriation of mind, which causes men to claim as their own deeds they never did, and with Locke exhibiting his wild fancies, such as an amputated little finger that assumes the person to whom the finger once belonged, the soul of a prince entering the body of a cobbler, a parrot that becomes a man, and a man that becomes a pig.

As for sympathy, neither is much concerned to talk about it. Hobbes makes some perfunctory remarks about pity as ultimately a selfish emotion; Locke talks of the sympathy we feel for body parts that are still attached. But what they did between them was to open up political and social avenues to sympathy that did not exist before. Hobbes concedes that we enter into civil society on a gust of fear, and that many of our transactions within the artificial man are fuelled by passion. The important thing is to regulate the passions, and the fictions they produce, according to the standard of probability and verisimilitude. This is the litmus test of the difference between gloriation of mind and authorized impersonation, between fancies that are incredible and those worthy of belief. It is a standard needed to govern the fiction of sympathy itself, namely the fiction that one person may enter into the feelings or even the identity of another; a fiction that in Locke's view runs dangerously close to Pythagorean metempsychosis, and its associated lie (the favourite of the Cartesians): pre-existence.

Mandeville, a medical man and former Cartesian, and latterly a fabulist, translator of La Fontaine and author of the notorious *The Fable of the Bees*, fully exploits empiricism in his discussion of sympathy while being thoroughly alive to the issue of fiction. Sympathy is empirical truth of the first water, for a scene of suffering impinges directly on our sight and hearing.

It comes in either at the Eye or the Ear, or both; and the nearer and more violently the Object of Compassion strikes those Senses, the greater Disturbance it causes in us, often to such a Degree as to occasion great Pain and Anxiety.⁵

This is where Mandeville locates the real, in the passions arising from objects that strike directly upon the senses, and none more powerfully than objects of compassion. Passions such as shame, pride, anxiety and vicarious pain are 'Realities in our Frame, and not imaginary Qualities'.⁶ They have specific physical symptoms, and they are the indices of our actual engagement with the material facts of the world. It is with an almost Cartesian certainty he makes the claim for reality of passion, as opposed to the truth of thought. Nevertheless, this gives him a very useful handle on the instrumental fictions of civil society, the chief of which is the pretence that we are immune to the realities of passion. The social individual, according to Mandeville, is one who 'strains all his Faculties to appear what his shallow Noddle imagines he is believ'd to be'.⁷ Each of us, Mandeville suggests,

operates at three levels of deceit, for first there is the struggle to appear as we are not; second the effort to make that appearance consistent with a picture of ourselves painted by the imagination; and third we try to make the picture which we are now embodying agreeable with the erroneous impression we hope the public has already formed of us. The social self is the least trustworthy sign of what we really are, and compassion or sympathy is the most reliable. Rousseau read Mandeville with great attention, and he agreed with him about this.

In different ways Hume and Burke echo Mandeville. Hume considers personal identity to be based on a fiction, and any attempt to consult Shaftesbury's vocal looking glass in order to get closer to a real sense of the self ends up in a theatre where the figures representing our state of mind participate in a drama that is an entire mystery. These inadequate ideas are eloquent testimony to the priority of sensation and passion over any rule of reason which deserves, in Hume's notorious phrase, to be the slave of the passions. Apart from avoiding manifest lies, there is nothing to do but follow our taste and inclination which, in the social world, means a perpetual experience of shared feelings, sometimes painful but mostly pleasurable. In his account of sympathy as a social phenomenon Burke agrees; but it is during his examination of sympathy as a channel of sublime delight that he shows how far his *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* fails to be what he claimed it was, namely a rationale of the passions. Too often, he says, in what is plainly a rebuke to Hutcheson and others who believe in the hegemony of self-reflection, we turn to reason to explain the reality of our passions, when in fact 'the influence of reason in producing our passions is nothing near so extensive as it is commonly believed'. This is why the experience of the sublime, including the sublime of sympathy, is simply astonishing, wonderful, inexplicable: what we have no choice but to feel. He calls this 'the triumph of the real sympathy'.⁸

The trouble with this standard of passionate reality invoked by Mandeville, Hume and Burke is that it is associated with an inability to understand it as anything but discrete instances of powerful feeling. It is only with the addition of fiction in the form of a factitious unity of self, depending upon a spurious continuity of remembered sensations, that we can incorporate passion into a personal narrative. On this topic Vicky Kahn has many useful things to say. She points out that the fiction of civil society, including the fiction of the state of nature and the fiction of an original contract, depending according to Hobbes on the fiction of sovereign power which like a personification is both the guarantor and the outcome of that contract, are part of the network of fictions needed to invent a history capable of supplanting the history of *jus divinum*. The price paid for telling history suddenly in a different manner and with a different plot was that it was vulnerable to the same kind of interruption, especially if its fictions became implausible. So she points out how closely intertwined were the issues

of probability and politics in the years before the Glorious Revolution, and how necessary it was to engage the passions and particularly the sympathy of an audience when telling a credible fiction of state. Only in this way could fictions forge a political reality, having consequences whose importance and actuality could not be denied.⁹ Just such a fiction is to be found in Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, a novel often read as an allegory of an individual's entry into civil society from a state of nature by means of contract. What is surprising about the critical moment in Crusoe's re-socialization, his rescue of Friday and his consolidation of his community on the island, is that it is itself a fiction, spun out of his own imagination in the form of a dream that then takes place and becomes real. Such preposterous realism seems to be inevitably part of the history of sympathy, and of the history of the novel.

When Crusoe makes first makes his appearance as the contractually confirmed governor of his island, it is not in the person of the governor, but the person of that person, who is of course 'all a Fiction,' just like the other. Consequently,

When I shew'd my self to the two Hostages, it was with the Captain, who told them, I was the Person the Governour had order'd to look after them ... as we never suffer'd them to see me as Governour, so I now appear'd as another Person.¹⁰

Locke's superstructure of the person who represents the self now has an extra level, the person of the person of the self. It is a redoubling that may have suggested itself to Adam Smith via Cudworth's *hegemonicon*, or variations on it, for Cudworth defined it as follows, 'the soul as comprehending itself ... and holding itself, as it were, in its own hand, as if redoubled upon itself'.¹¹ Smith makes a significant advance in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* upon his early idea of sympathy merely as the work of imagination, no more than a hypothesis of someone else's agony. There he writes,

They [the senses] never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case.¹²

But when he is trying much later in his argument to protect his kind of sympathy from Mandeville's imputation of self-interest, he makes a very different point about the relation of persons to persons:

Sympathy ... cannot ... be regarded as a selfish principle ... though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the person chiefly concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathise ... I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own.¹³

The whole system of propriety which underwrote his earlier position, namely that his imagination would allow him to represent someone else's sensations in such a way as to bring them home to his own bosom, and in effect to make them his own property, has now been reversed. And what seems to enable the reversal is the addition of an extra person: this imaginary change is supposed to happen to me in the person and character of the person with whom I sympathize. It is significant too that a change of personal situations which was formerly *represented* by means of my imagination in my own person, now *happens* to me in someone else's.

Smith has four categories of unpropertied sympathy, where things happen to persons. One is female humanity which prompts us to do 'what this exquisite sympathy would of its own accord prompt us to do'.¹⁴ The second is similar, being an unreflective absorption in physical circumstances where objects act immediately on the passions, and he cites Robinson Crusoe's experience as an example, presumably the episode of the clay pot, where he feels such joy at having made it.¹⁵ The third is the next step, when we feel irrational anger a stone that has hurt us, or love for a thing that has helped us, such as the plank that saved us from drowning.¹⁶ Finally there are scenes in tragedies where persons are forced to behold themselves as creatures not of what they meant to do but of what has happened to them, as persons of the persons they thought they were.¹⁷ In all four categories it is not free will that generates passion or sympathy, it is what Smith calls Fortune. Fortune specializes in personifying things and making new persons of persons. Shaftesbury's worst fear of sympathy, namely that it can change us in spite of our best intentions into someone we would scarcely recognize, is brought forward by Smith as the chief characteristic of disinterested sympathy.

This is a most fruitful departure from Hutcheson's and Shaftesbury's idealization of the self; likewise it begins to dismantle the fiction of an intelligible continuity upon which Hume says the empiricist person is based. At the same time Smith steers clear of Burke's ignorance in the face of what deeply moves us, nor does he treat the drama of a person altered by force of circumstance as the sort of futile pageant Hume outlines. He is pointing the way to some sort of alternative realism, using a representation of the self capable of yielding knowledge of the passions, or perhaps a passionate knowledge, free from fiction. Indeed, since the novel itself has such a large stake in the passions and in sympathy, and since it has usually been viewed as a genre aligned more than any other with empiricist claims for knowledge, Smith's alternative presents the fascinating possibility of another kind of fiction, one in which the passionate person of the person has a role, as in novels such as *Roxana*, *The Female Quixote*, *The Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph* and *Tristram Shandy*; not to mention *Clarissa*, in which the heroine announces, 'I have escaped, but *I*, my *best self*, have not escaped'.¹⁸ Another important contribution made by Smith to the debate about fiction is

his development of Hume's idea of sympathy as a force which includes more than just human beings. That we can feel for things, and even invest them with feelings, is a concession that begins to make sense of that large sub-genre of the eighteenth-century novel which deals with first-person memoirs of things, animals, insects and even atoms. He invites us to consider these personifications not as an anthropomorphizing rhetorical trick, but rather as a literary experiment in relating property to unpropertyed experience, sympathy which we bring home to our own bosoms, and sympathy which happens to us, and makes us feel like someone else. Smith says that Fortune, the agent which fashions new persons on top of old ones, was responsible for the subjection of West Africans

to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to wretches who possess the virtues neither of the countries which they come from, not of those which go to, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly expose them to the contempt of the vanquished.¹⁹

It is a judgement shared by the non-human persons who write their lives, who often make it sufficiently plain that being human is not a condition they admire. Their sense of the tyranny of Fortune prepared the way for the next stage of the genre, memoirs of people who had lost their persons to the people who had made them their property. When restored to personhood these people found it hard to accept on the terms offered, namely a gift of what had been unjustly seized in the first place: and these are slave narratives, in which sympathies of all kinds, propertyed and unpropertyed, social and horrid, are on show.

Above all, Smith understands, like Sterne, the intimate connection between the life of the passions and the structure of the market. While he would like to trace in its operations a force of providential government, the irregularity of Fortune prevents him. Talking of the law of unintended consequences, he points out how often she punishes the best plans with the worst outcomes, and then public opinion is sure to compound the disappointment.

The happy or unprosperous event of any action, is not only apt to give us a good or bad opinion of the prudence with which it was conducted, but almost always too animates our gratitude or resentment, our sense of the merit or demerit of the design.²⁰

Bad luck is the badge of moral deficiency. No man cares to have his virtues made the sport of contingencies, Sterne's Yorick says, but he proves again and again that chance determines outcomes, not the will, and that the world judges accordingly. Mandeville had already enjoyed the paradoxes resulting from the disparity between claims for the simplicity of moral virtue and the way it is actually sustained, thus prudence depends upon inconstancy, chastity on organized licentiousness, wealth upon profligacy, meanwhile good springs up and pullulates from evil. It is a state of affairs that Malthus was to explain according to a

law not of unintended consequences but of symmetrical disappointment, where every human trial of happiness ensures an outcome quite the reverse.

Darwin explained his *Origin of Species* as Malthus applied to all of nature. A. R. Wallace said that he could not have theorized natural selection without having read Malthus on population. But rather than the so-called Social Darwinism that was abstracted by others from the system of natural selection, Darwin and Wallace synthesized the various explorations of the nature of change and mutability that had exercised historians such as Raynal and Gibbon, linguists such as Monboddo and Rousseau, natural historians such as Buffon and Lamarck, as well as political philosophers such as Montesquieu and Mandeville. Against them had been arrayed a powerful orthodoxy defending the reality and hierarchy of species, the impossibility of extinction, the stability and permanence of national character, and the truth of the scriptural account of the creation. The harshness of this latter school is evident in the opinions of Joseph Banks on the insignificance of animal pain and Thomas Jefferson on the justification of slavery. The generosity of the former is exhibited in their attitudes towards the sentient and even the vegetable parts of the world, which were owing to their sense of a purely provisional, non-necessary and non-essential difference between the human and non-human. Before Darwin wrote on the common emotions of humans and animals, Buffon and Mandeville had pointed out that the pain of creatures with central nervous systems like ours was an event to which we could not possibly be indifferent. Sympathy was in this sense not an expression of humanity but of a sensibility shared among numerous branches of evolved life. In the Andes Darwin heard the sobering sound of a mountain torrent tumbling stones down its bed, and he had a vision not just of their destination as ocean mud, but of the universal waste to which everything would come. From this vast perspective of time and the terrible metamorphosis it will accomplish, Darwin drew consolation from the companionship of all living things, especially dogs. We can say that sympathy evolved in the eighteenth century to the extent that its cultural manifestations changed and opinions about it altered. But more importantly sympathy was the experience of change, which as Smith says *happens* to each individual as if that individual were someone or something else.